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Pragmatism is the claim that there are practical reasons for belief—i.e., reasons for
belief that are provided by the practical (prudential or moral) value of having the
belief. Evidentialists deny that the practical value of having a belief can provide us
with a normative reason for this belief. They usually do so on the grounds that
considerations about practical value cannot be motivating reasons for belief: it
seems that one cannot believe that one will recover from one’s severe illness for the
reason that having this belief would make one more likely to survive.1
Evidentialists who pursue this line of argument claim that we can only believe
for reasons that bear on the truth of the belief, and that therefore only evidence can
provide us with a genuine normative reason for belief.2 Pragmatists reply that, at
least sometimes, we can believe for practical reasons.3
Note that the dispute between evidentialism and pragmatism is not about our
actual psychology. Without any doubt, there are advantageous but epistemically not
fully rational beliefs. Think about over-optimistic beliefs about our own capabil-
ities,4 over-beneficial beliefs about significant others,5 or evidentially unsupported
beliefs about religious matters.6 Evidentialists do not deny that such beliefs
contribute to a beneficial make-up of our psychology, or even to a better life in
general. Neither do they deny that practical considerations influence and cause our
beliefs in ways that can be beneficial to us, and that such considerations can thus be
part of an explanation why someone has a belief (say, in cases of wishful thinking).
1 I follow Rinard (2019b) and Leary (2017) in putting the evidentialists’ constraint on what can count as
a reason for belief in terms of motivation. Another way to put the constraint is in terms of guidance (cf.
Way & Whiting 2016).
2 See Hieronymi (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009) and Shah (2003, 2006). Reisner (2018) calls these ‘new style
arguments’ for evidentialism. He distinguishes them from mostly earlier ones that merely appeal to
doxastic involuntarism—the claim that we lack direct voluntary control over belief—and ‘ought implies
can’ (cf. Adler, 2002; Alston, 1988; Hookway, 2002; Kelly, 2002; Parfit, 2011, Appendix A; Pojman,
1985). The ‘new style arguments’ can be viewed as advancements on the earlier ones, for they share the
same spirit.
3 We can distinguish between moderate pragmatism and radical pragmatism. Leary (2017), McCormick
(2015, 2018), and Reisner (2008, 2009, 2018) are moderate pragmatists: they argue that at least some
reasons for belief are practical. Rinard (2015, 2017, 2019a, b) is radical: she argues that evidence does not
provide us with reasons at all, and that thus only practical reasons are reasons for belief. Meiland (1980)
already defended a similarly radical view. Stich (1990) is also close to Rinard’s view, although he is not
so much concerned with what we have reason to believe, but rather with the evaluation of cognitive
processes. Harman (1999) and Feldman (2000, esp. 691–694) are earlier proponents of the moderate
view. Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to Stich and Harman.
4 Hazlett (2013, 44–52) cites studies which suggest that overestimating one’s capabilities can promote
one’s wellbeing.
5 See McCormick (2015, 60–61), who is following Stroud (2006). However, see Crawford’s (2020)
argument that close relationships do not require unresponsiveness to the evidence, even if pragmatism
was true.
6 See McCormick (2015, 61–65). The classical point of reference for the idea that we should believe in
God even in the absence of sufficient evidence is Pascal (1670). See also James (1896).
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What evidentialists deny, rather, is that practical considerations can ever function as
reasons for belief.7
Evidentialists agree with pragmatists that practical considerations can serve as
reasons for actions: they agree that the fact that having an over-optimistic belief
about your own chances of recovery could give you a reason to bring about or to
cultivate such a belief—say, by not listening to the doctors and instead reading
optimistic stories about recovery.8 What evidentialists deny is that the practical
benefit of having a certain belief can provide you with a reason to believe that you
have more chances to recover than your evidence indicates. That is, evidentialists
argue that pragmatists fail to respect a distinction between reasons for actions and
reasons for belief.9
The new pragmatists, as I call them here,10 argue that this distinction does not
fare well with our intuitive judgments about reasons for anything we do indirectly.
For instance, we can be said to write a book for the reason that writing gives us
pleasure, although we cannot write a book just like that—i.e., without performing
more basic actions. The new pragmatists argue, by analogy, that we can sometimes
be said to believe for practical reasons even though we do something else in order to
adopt the relevant belief. Put succinctly: indirect motivation is sufficient for
believing for practical reasons. Denying this, so the new pragmatists argue, would
force us to ‘say that, in general, we do not have motivating reasons for anything we
do indirectly’ (Rinard, 2019b, 775).11
I will examine this line of argument and discuss its limits. I argue that it does not
support pragmatism unless we assume that there are irreducible reasons to be in
non-intentional states—like the state of being outside or having short hair. I do so
7 Nor must evidentialists deny that pragmatic factors influence what is rational to believe. According to
what is described as ‘pragmatic encroachment’ in epistemology (cf. Kim and McGrath, 2019 for a recent
volume), the evidential threshold that is required to epistemically justify a belief depends on the practical
stakes at play if one is wrong. These stakes, however, do not qualify as reasons for which we believe. Cf.
Crawford’s (2020, 92) distinction between two kinds of doxastic partialism that rests on this distinction.
However, cf. Worsnip (2020) for a recent argument why pragmatic encroachment implies pragmatism. I
need not decide this dispute here.
8 Following Flowerree (2020), we can distinguish between truth-oriented belief-management (like
impartial inquiry, investigation, deliberation, or reasoning) and belief-management that aims at having a
practically valuable belief independently of whether it is true (avoiding challenging information, omitting
deliberation, active self-deception, staying in one’s social ‘bubble’, etc.). It is important to note this
distinction in order to see the multifarious activities that ‘causing’ or ‘maintaining’ a belief can amount to.
But the distinction is not central to my argument here.
9 In some cases, a reason for an action might also be evidence for the truth of the belief that the action
brings about. The fact that I promised to help you can be a reason for me to help you and evidence that I
will help you (if I am a reliable person). However, according to evidentialism, the practical reason here is
not a reason for belief in virtue of the fact that it shows that the belief is valuable; rather, it is a reason for
belief in virtue of the fact that it constitutes evidence for the belief, i.e., indicates the truth of the belief.
10 This is an allusion to Rinard (2015) who calls the evidentialists mentioned in note 2 who appeal to a
motivational constraint on reasons ‘new evidentialists’ (cf. esp. Shah, 2006).
11 For the most explicit recent statements of this strategy, cf. Leary (2017, 537–540), McCormick (2018,
641), Reisner (2009, 269–270; 2018, 722), Rinard (2015, 2019a, 1939–1944, 2019b, 775). Of course, this
is not the only argument for pragmatism presented by these authors, but it is one popular line that merits
explicit discussion.
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by showing that the argument is best understood as drawing an analogy between
belief and non-intentional states, and as then arguing that since there can be
practical reasons for the latter, there must also be practical reasons for the former.
Evidentialists are fine with the existence of practical ‘state-reasons’ for belief—as I
will call them—if such reasons are just reducible to reasons to act. For instance,
saying that you have a reason to have short hair would, according to the
evidentialist’s analysis, merely amount to saying that you have a reason to get your
hair cut. Analogously, any state-reason to believe that p would just be a reason to
bring the belief about, or to maintain it. That is, talk about such practical reasons for
belief would be merely an elliptical reference to reasons for actions. The new
pragmatists have to deny this intuitively attractive analysis of state-reasons.12
I furthermore argue that denying the evidentialist’s analysis of state-reasons is
hard to maintain as long as one accepts a version of the
motivational constraint on reasons: A consideration R is a reason for a person
S to give a response u only if S can u for R.
I do not defend the constraint here, but merely consider whether the new pragmatists
are successful in arguing that practical reasons can satisfy it.13 Pragmatists who
argue that practical considerations meet the constraint have precisely two options.
They can either argue that practical considerations can indirectly motivate belief—
i.e., that we can sometimes bring about or maintain a belief for practical reasons; or
else that practical considerations can directly motivate belief—i.e., that we can
sometimes just believe directly on the basis of a practical consideration without first
having to perform any actions. Since I argue that the first strategy presupposes that
state-reasons are not reducible to reasons to act, my argument will leave pragmatists
with precisely two ways to defend the claim that practical reasons for belief could
meet the motivational constraint:
(i) Either they argue that state-reasons for belief are not reducible to reasons to
act (or to try, intend, desire);
(ii) or they argue that we can sometimes believe directly for practical reasons.
12 Parfit (2011, 51, Appendix A), who accepts such a reductive analysis of state-reasons, points out that
state-reasons might additionally be reasons to desire the state. Evidentialists of course do not deny that we
can, for instance, rationally desire to believe in God because of the benefits of this doxastic state. I tend to
agree with Berker (2018, 461–467), however, that practical reasons for belief cannot be analyzed as
reasons to desire. Reasons to try, intend, or desire to be in a state will play a role in my argument in
Sect. 6, however, where I formulate a challenge for new pragmatism.
13 This focus is justified given that my discussion is about the argument brought forward by the
pragmatists in note 11—an argument that is meant to show that we can believe for practical reasons. Next
to Shah’s and Hieronymi’s arguments that rely on such a constraint (cf. note 2 above), cf. Way and
Whiting (2016)’s discussion of the constraint. They reply to arguments against it, brought forward
especially by Schroeder (2007, 165–166), that are based on massively outweighed reasons or on self-
effacing reasons (like your reason to go to your surprise party). In response to these arguments, Way and
Whiting argue that the constraint only implies the ‘general capacity’ to comply with a reason. Note also
that Schroeder (2021) accepts that one ‘earmark’ of normative reasons is that they can be ‘acted on’—i.e.,
that they can be proper bases for responses. I return to the constraint in more detail in Sect. 6.
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I turn to the notion of a ‘state-reason’ at the end of Sect. 3, and I discuss it in more
detail in Sect. 6 (where I also explain the brackets at the end of (i)). If I am right,
then the dialectic between evidentialism and pragmatism presents itself in an
interesting shape. Endorsing either (i) or (ii) is sufficient for pragmatism.
Evidentialists therefore have to deny both (i) and (ii). Of course, pragmatists could
also reject the motivational constraint on reasons.14 I will not engage with this
strategy here. Rather, my argument addresses the debate between evidentialists and
pragmatists insofar as it concerns the question of whether there are genuine practical
reasons for belief that meet the motivational constraint.
Section 2 presents two recent arguments by pragmatists, the argument from
causation and the argument from indirect motivation. I show that the former hinges
on the latter. Sections 3 and 4 argue that these arguments establish that there are
practical reasons for belief in the same sense as there can be practical reasons for
being in non-intentional states—what I call ‘state-reasons’. Evidentialists therefore
must argue that such reasons are reducible to reasons to act, rather than denying the
existence of state-reasons. Section 5 presents the two dialectical options for
pragmatists (i) and (ii) in more detail. Section 6 argues that if pragmatists accept the
motivational constraint on reasons, the prospects for (i) are dim. I conclude that it
might therefore be more promising for pragmatists to defend (ii)—the possibility of
(in a sense) believing at will.
2 Mere causation and indirect motivation
In her recent article, Rinard (2019b, 769–778) argues for pragmatism by appeal to
cases in which evidence merely causes us to have a belief but does not function as a
reason for which we believe. She argues that, if such cases are conceivable, then we
can also conceive of cases in which we have reasons to put ourselves into a position
in which the evidence then merely causes us to have a belief without providing a
reason for which we believe. Since in such cases evidence is a mere cause and not a
reason for which we believe, the evidentialist is committed to the claim that we do
not believe for a reason in these cases although we brought the belief about for a
reason. However, according to Rinard, this is implausible, and we should therefore
accept that we believe for practical reasons in these cases. Call this the argument
from mere causation.
Interestingly, the argument from mere causation rests on Rinard’s following
point about motivation:
This view [that we sometimes believe for no reason even though we brought
about the belief for a reason] comes with a high cost: it is hard to square with
14 Rinard (2017, 217–218) claims that any consideration that favors a belief by indicating its practical
value is a reason for this belief, thereby implying that she does not commit to the motivational constraint.
However, she also defends the view that practical reasons for belief can meet the motivational constraint
(cf., e.g., the references in note 11).
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commonsense views about motivating reasons in certain non-doxastic cases.
Consider, for example, the cases […] of breaking the window, or slowing
down when you see the police car. In these cases we are happy to say that the
reasons for which the agent breaks the window, or slows down, are practical.
We are happy to say this even though the way in which the agent did these
things was to put in motion a multistage causal process that ultimately brought
about the desired result. (Rinard, 2019b, 775)
Rinard presents this argument from indirect motivation in more detail in an earlier
article (cf. Rinard, 2015). The central claim is that sometimes we u for a reason R
by wing for R (where wing need not be identical to or constitutive of uing; and
where ‘u’ might be an action, a belief, or even a non-intentional state; while wing, I
take it, must refer to an action). If we were to deny this claim for reasons for
belief—i.e., by arguing that we do not believe for R when we bring about the belief
for R—then we would sometimes believe for no reason even though we brought the
belief about for a reason (assuming that Rinard’s cases from mere causation by the
evidence are possible). Interestingly, the argument from mere causation therefore
presupposes the soundness of the argument from indirect motivation.
Rinard illustrates the argument from indirect motivation with the following case:
[S]uppose you’re getting ready to go snowshoeing, and you are trying to
decide which socks to wear. Last time you wore cotton socks, and your feet
were too cold. You know wool is warmer than cotton, and so you’ll be more
comfortable if you wear wool. Surely this constitutes a genuine pragmatic
reason in favor of wearing wool socks. But note that appreciating this
consideration does not lead you directly to wearing them; it leads you directly
only to an intention to take steps toward wearing them, such as opening your
dresser drawer, finding and removing the wool socks, etc. So it fails Shah’s
requirement for a consideration to count as a genuine reason. But surely the
fact that you’ll be most comfortable if you wear wool socks does constitute a
genuine reason for wearing them. (Rinard, 2015, 212–213)
Rinard points out that the fact that I have to first form the intention to wear wool
socks, and then open the drawer, get them out, and put them on, before I finally
wear them is not in conflict with the fact that I end up wearing the wool socks for a
reason—namely, the same reason for which I formed the intention to wear them,
opened the drawer, etc. Analogously, the fact that I first have to form the intention to
bring a belief that p about and then take certain steps to bring the belief that p about
before I finally believe that p is not in conflict with the fact that I believe for a
reason—namely, for the same reason for which I brought my believing about,
which was a practical reason. Thus, Rinard concludes, there are practical reasons for
belief.
I will reply to the new pragmatist’s strategy by examining the limits of the
argument from indirect motivation, and thereby also the limits of the argument from
causation. For the latter argument presupposes the former. The discussion therefore
focuses on the argument from indirect motivation. I briefly return to the argument
from causation in conclusion.
S. Schmidt
123
I start in Sect. 3 by presenting the evidentialist’s response to the argument.
Evidentialists should grant that beliefs can be indirect responses to practical reasons.
But evidentialists should then argue that any practical reason that motivates belief
indirectly is reducible to a reason for a basic action: it is not a genuine reason for
belief.
Throughout Sect. 3, I will assume that the argument from indirect motivation
draws on an analogy between reasons for belief and reasons for being in non-
intentional states. This is not uncontroversial, especially given Rinard’s example of
‘wearing wool socks’—which we might intuitively understand as a non-basic
action, rather than as a state. However, we should be careful not to be misled by
grammar: even though ‘wearing’ is the participle form of a verb, wearing is hardly
something you actively do. ‘What did you do this weekend?’—‘I wore my wool
socks.’ This reply is at best a joke, meaning that one did not really do anything
special at all.15
I consider an objection to this assumption in Sect. 4. There I discuss whether the
argument from indirect motivation should be read as drawing an analogy between
beliefs and non-basic actions, rather than as an analogy between beliefs and non-
intentional states. I argue that this is not a fruitful way of understanding the
argument. First, it would make the evidentialist’s reduction of practical reasons for
belief to reasons to act even more plausible, for basic actions are constitutive for
non-basic actions, but not constitutive for states. Secondly, beliefs can hardly be
understood as non-basic actions. They are more plausibly states.
3 Practical reasons for belief as state-reasons
Consider how an evidentialist could set out a reply to the argument from indirect
motivation. In a first step, the evidentialist could grant that we can talk about ‘a
practical reason to wear wool socks’. In a second step, they could then deny that this
implies that there are genuine practical reasons for wearing wool socks. That is, they
could argue that statements about reasons to be in states are mere elliptical
references to reasons for bringing yourself into the state, or for maintaining the state.
Strictly speaking, there are no practical reasons to be in a state.
Consider, for instance, the following statement: ‘You should be outside—it is
such nice weather today!’ This sentence does not imply that you can just like that be
outside by responding to the stated reason. Yet the sentence implies, in some sense,
a reason to be outside. It would be absurd to say this sentence to someone who is
currently incapable of going outside because they are, say, locked in for the whole
day. In such a case, it could at best be understood as a mere evaluative statement,
rather than as a normative one: it would merely state that it would be good for you to
be outside, but not that you have a genuine reason. The absurdity in this case seems
15 Cf. Setiya’s (2013, 181) distinction between present participles that often refer to something dynamic
(shaking, buying, starting) and those that refer to something static (being red, owning, knowing). Cf. also
Chrisman (2012, 598), who provides further examples for sentences that employ the progressive form of a
verb without describing activity.
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to stem from the fact that we normally use such sentences as implying reasons. They
are not normally just disguised evaluative claims. At the same time, it seems that the
implied reasons are not genuine reasons to be in the state, but rather reasons to act: a
‘reason to be outside’ is a reason to ensure that you are outside by going outside or
by staying there.
Thus, if the argument from indirect motivation is best understood as establishing
that there are practical reasons for belief in the same sense as there are practical
reasons for being in non-intentional states, then it crucially rests on the falsity of the
evidentialist’s reductive analysis of reasons to be in states. Let us call such a reason
a
state-reason: a practical consideration that figures in the kind of reason-
relation that sometimes holds between practical considerations and non-
intentional states.
Common examples of state-reasons are your reason to be outside (the weather is
nice), your reason to be in London next year (there is an important conference), your
reason to be a philosopher (it makes your life more meaningful), and your reason to
wear a hat (it makes you more stylish). Such considerations are practical because
they indicate the value of the respective state, thereby giving us, in some sense, a
reason to be in that state. Intuitively, state-reasons seem to be analyzable in terms of
reasons for bringing states about, or reasons to maintain them, which is why the
latter reasons seem to be more fundamental. If they are indeed analyzable in this
way, then the fact that there are practical state-reasons for belief will not support
pragmatism. For evidentialists are fine with practical reasons for bringing beliefs
about or for maintaining beliefs.16
Here is a first objection to my interpretation of the argument from indirect
motivation. The new pragmatists could contend that the argument does not merely
establish that there are state-reasons for belief. Rather, it establishes a stronger
claim: that we can be in states for practical reasons—including states of belief—in
the same sense as we can act for practical reasons. This is because one can also
never just act as a direct response to a reason. Rather, when we act, it is the intention
to act that is a direct response to the reason, rather than the action itself (Rinard,
2015, 215). Therefore, if evidentialists want to exclude practical reasons for belief
on the grounds ‘that genuine reasons for /-ing must be capable of leading the agent
directly to /-ing, with no causal intermediaries’ (ibid.), they are also forced to deny
genuine practical reasons for basic actions. Surely this is absurd.
But this objection implies that we can never act directly for reasons. As Joseph
Raz (2011, 57) points out, this would be ‘to misconceive the relations of intention
and action, imagining that when acting intentionally one acts by forming an
16 I avoid the label ‘state-given reason’ for two reasons. First, the distinction between state-given and
object-given reasons is meant to be applicable only to intentional states, while state-reasons are also (and
primarily) reasons for being in non-intentional states. Secondly, the claim that there are state-given
reasons for belief is often viewed as controversial. By contrast, state-reasons for belief are uncontroversial




intention that causes one to act’. Even if one is not willing to accept that one can put
on wool socks as an immediate response to reasons, it seems that one should accept
that one can perform the basic actions involved in putting on wool socks (moving
one’s limbs) directly for reasons—on pain of otherwise excluding our bodily
movements from the reach of our direct control.
However, let us grant to Rinard that intentions are causal intermediaries
whenever we perform basic actions for reasons.17 Does that imply that basic actions
cannot—like states in general—be immediate responses to practical reasons?
Not if we distinguish between causal and motivational immediacy.18 It is true that
when we act for a reason, many causal processes take place in our body before we
perform the action. Some of these causal processes might include an intention to
act—maybe it is even true that we always form an intention to act before we act.
However, none of this implies that only the intention, but not the action causally
resulting from the intention, is motivationally immediate. For we do not perform an
action by first forming an intention—in the same way as we do not perform an
action by first firing our neurons. That is, neither our intention nor the firing of our
neurons is a means that we could take in order to perform an action. Rather, as
Rinard points out herself (2015, 216), intentions are themselves not under our direct
voluntary control.19 This is why intentions cannot be motivational mediators.
Therefore, as long as we keep causal and motivational immediacy apart, we can say
that our basic actions are often—in contrast to states and non-basic actions—
motivationally direct responses to practical reasons.
If I am right that the argument from indirect motivation is meant to conclude that
there are state-reasons for belief, then it presupposes that state-reasons are not just
reducible to reasons for causing the state: the content of ‘a reason to be in states’
must be more than merely ‘a reason to bring oneself into (or to maintain) s’. As we
will see, this will give the debate on evidentialism and pragmatism an interesting
dialectical shape. For it highlights how thinking about state-reasons and their
relationship to reasons for action is central to the dispute: the new pragmatists have
to argue that state-reasons are irreducible; while evidentialists must argue that they
are reducible so as to avoid new pragmatism.20
17 Cf. Mele (1997, 242–243) for some opposition to the view that deciding always involves an intention
to so decide, and for further references on this discussion.
18 The distinction is inspired by Bennett (1990, 105–106), who calls the causal immediacy ‘ontological’.
He argues that we cannot form a belief without first inducing causal changes in the body, but he points out
that this does not prove that we cannot believe at will—i.e., believe directly without motivational
mediation. Cf. also Leary (2017, 536, n. 11) for a similar distinction and criticism of Rinard’s appeal to
causality instead of motivation.
19 Rinard supports the claim by appeal to Kavka’s (1983) toxin puzzle.
20 As an anonymous referee pointed out to me, the idea that state-reasons are relevant to the debate on
pragmatism is not particularly new. Arguably, any evidentialist who has argued that purported practical
reasons for belief are actually just reasons for bringing belief about, or for trying to do so, or for intending
to do so, or for desiring to believe, was concerned with state-reasons for belief (cf. notes 2 and 12 for
references; cf. Berker, 2018, 482, n. 22 for a very helpful overview). On the pragmatist’s side,
Rinard (2017) argues that belief is subject to the same practical norms as any non-intentional state.
Reisner (2009) sometimes puts his pragmatism in terms of there being practical reasons to have a belief
(266–267), or practical reasons for ‘ending up in a belief state’ (271). (Cf. my discussion of his argument
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There are two worries about how state-reasons could be central to the dispute
between evidentialism and pragmatism. The first is that ‘wearing wool socks’ is not
a state but a non-basic action, and that I therefore misinterpreted the analogy of the
argument from indirect motivation. I turn to this objection separately in Sect. 4
below. As we will see, it can be easily rejected.
The second worry is that state-reasons are reasons for non-intentional states,
while reasons for belief are reasons for intentional states—namely, belief. But why
should discussing the former reasons help us to illuminate the latter?
To address this second worry, we first need to remind ourselves that the argument
from indirect motivation is an argument by analogy. It claims that sometimes, the
reason-relation between a fact that supports a belief and the supported belief is the
same as the reason-relation between a fact that supports your wearing wool socks
and your wearing wool socks. The indirectness of the reason-relation does not, so
the argument goes, preclude the fact from being a genuine reason for the response it
supports. However, I have pointed out that this only holds if the state-reason for
wearing wool socks—or, respectively, for belief—is not merely a reason for putting
on wool socks and for not taking them off—or, respectively, for bringing oneself
into the state of belief and for maintaining it. Since the argument relies on this
analogy to non-intentional states, it must be understood as pointing out that non-
intentional states and intentional states belong to the common category of states,
and that there can be practical reasons for anything that falls into this common
category. What we therefore can conclude from the argument from indirect
motivation is that there are practical reasons for belief as there are practical reasons
to be in any non-intentional state: there are state-reasons for belief. However, my
point is that this does not, by itself, establish that there are genuine practical reasons
for belief. Rather, the argument crucially hinges on the assumption that state-
reasons are not just reasons to act.
It is helpful to consider some examples of claims that might express state-reasons
for belief in order to get a closer grip on the idea that some reasons for belief are
state-reasons. Having decisive state-reasons for a belief would amount to a ‘doxastic
state-ought’: a practical requirement to be in a certain state of belief.21 If the
evidentialist’s reductive analysis of state-reasons was correct, then any expression
of a doxastic state-ought would amount to a claim about what an agent should do in
order to bring about or maintain a state of belief. I suspect that we sometimes do
Footnote 20 continued
from ‘blocked ascent’ in Sect. 6.) Furthermore, Stich (1990, 133) already claimed that the practical value
of states of affairs that are the outcome of our cognitive processes is central to cognitive evaluation.
However, my argument here is more specific. My claim is that the new pragmatist’s strategy depends
on the irreducibility of reasons to be in non-intentional states—this claim has not been defended before,
as far as I know. Recognizing this will present the debate in an interesting shape by clarifying the
pragmatist’s and evidentialist’s dialectical options. Cf. esp. Sections 5 and the end of the concluding
Sect. 7 on this dialectical shape.
21 Cf. Chrisman (2008, 2012) on doxastic state-oughts and on how they might imply reasons to act.
However, note that Chrisman’s project is to understand the epistemic ought as a state-ought. What I am
proposing here, by contrast, is that doxastic state-oughts are often not epistemic, but rather
straightforwardly practical claims about what one ought to do.
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express such oughts in our ordinary normative discourse about belief. Many of them
might be disguised as simple claims about what one ought to believe. For we do not
normally say ‘you ought (or you have a reason) to be in the state of believing that p’
or ‘you ought to bring about the state of believing that p’. Here are some potential
examples of such doxastic state-oughts, disguised as simple claims about what one
ought to believe:
(a) ‘you ought to (or should) believe in human-induced climate change’
(b) ‘people ought to have no racist beliefs’
(c) ‘the shipowner ought not just have believed that the ship is sea-worthy’22
(d) ‘you ought to believe in God’23
In many contexts such claims might express just an epistemic obligation to fit one’s
belief to one’s evidence. However, in other contexts they might instead express that
there are decisive state-reasons for belief—i.e., practical reasons for being in the
state of belief. This allows us to say that at least sometimes, the person who violates
such an ought does not merely commit an epistemic mistake, but also a practical
one.24 That also allows us to explain why we sometimes show distinctively moral
reactions—like resentment or indignation—to someone who fails to comply with an
ought to believe. For when one violates a state-ought-to-believe, one fails to comply
with practical reasons (i.e., state-reasons), not just with epistemic reasons.
It is important to emphasize how this use of ‘ought to believe’ can be compatible
with evidentialism. That there are doxastic state-oughts does nothing, by itself, to
show that pragmatism is true.25 For evidentialists can argue that, insofar as we show
distinctively moral reactions to those who fail to comply with these oughts, we
blame them for failing to inquire, or to reflect, or for not participating in the
religious life, or for directing their attention in questionable ways—rather than for
22 Remember that, in Clifford’s (1877) thought-experiment, the shipowner is at least partially blamed for
failing to engage in impartial inquiry—which is why the heading of Clifford’s first section is ‘The Duty of
Inquiry’.
23 Pascal (1670) advises us that we should participate in the religious life if we are unable to believe in
God just like that. And William James (1896, 11) advises us to sometimes allow our passional nature to
take over when we form religious beliefs—which suggests strategies consisting in the performance of
mental actions. Interestingly, both Clifford and James were to a great extent concerned with the question
of how to manage our doxastic lives—which explains even from an evidentialist’s point of view why the
background for their ethics of belief was practical (cf. Lindner, 2020; Mitova, 2010 for arguments why
Clifford was a ‘closet pragmatist’).
24 I say ‘sometimes’ because, as an anonymous referee pointed out to me, someone other than the person
who ‘ought to be’ in that state might be committing the practical mistake. For instance, if children ought
to believe that the earth is round, then parents and teachers might be responsible for ensuring that children
have this belief, and they are morally to blame if they fail to make it true that children comply with the
state-ought. Chrisman (2008, 2012) in particular highlights this interpersonal dimension of state-oughts.
See Chrisman (2020) on his social approach to epistemology.
25 I misleadingly claimed in the concluding section of Schmidt (2017) that the existence of doxastic
state-oughts supports a version of pragmatism. It only would support pragmatism if these state-oughts
were irreducible.
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just being in the state of believing.26 That is, evidentialists can argue that state-
oughts and state-reasons are ultimately just reducible to reasons to act. This
argumentative strategy, in combination with the observation that we sometimes use
‘ought to believe’ as implying state-reasons, provides evidentialists with a basis for
an attractive error-theory about purported practical reasons for belief that we
sometimes express in ordinary discourse.27
This section has argued that the argument from indirect motivation presupposes
that state-reasons are irreducible. I will consider their (ir)reducibility more closely
in Sect. 6. However, let us first consider an objection to the conclusion of this
section, mentioned briefly above: maybe we misunderstood the argument from
indirect motivation by reading it as appealing to state-reasons; for maybe ‘wearing
wool socks’ was meant by Rinard not as an example of a state, but rather as an
example of a non-basic action.
4 Practical reasons for belief as reasons for non-basic actions?
Rinard gives more examples than just ‘wearing wool socks’ in order to support her
claim that indirect motivation is sufficient for there being practical reasons for
belief. These examples suggest that her point is not that practical reasons for belief
are state-reasons. She could therefore, in principle, grant that state-reasons are
reducible to reasons to act, but argue that the argument from indirect motivation is
meant to establish a different analogy—namely, between reasons for belief and
reasons for non-basic actions. Here are Rinard’s further examples:
For example, that air pollution is worse in the city is a reason to live in the
country; that it’ll be easier for you to pay attention during a talk if you sit in
the front row than the back is a reason to sit in the front; that doing so would
be relaxing is a reason to spend some time in Costa Rica; etc. But none of
these considerations plays the particular role in the regulation of one’s /-ing
identified by the Evidentialists as necessary for it to count as a genuine reason.
(Rinard, 2015, 213)
26 Note, importantly, that many evidentialists are fine with the claim that we show distinctively epistemic
reactions towards people just because these people are in a state of belief that is insufficiently supported
by their evidence (even if the person lacked control over whether they are in this state). Such reactions
might include epistemic distrust and other distinctively epistemic reactive attitudes. Whether the
appropriateness of epistemic blame presupposes control is a different question from whether reactions
such as indignation and resentment presuppose control. Failing to distinguish between different kinds of
reactive attitudes that presuppose different kinds of capacities is the main reason why we get puzzled
about how we can be responsible not only for our actions, but also for our attitudes (Schmidt, 2020). See
Boult (2020, 2021a), Brown (2018), and Kauppinen (2018) on the nature of distinctive epistemic blame or
criticism. See Boult (2021b) for a recent overview of the literature on epistemic blame. See Schmidt
(2021) on how appealing to epistemic blame can help us make sense of a distinctively epistemic kind of
normativity.
27 Another instance of such a use of ‘ought to believe’ can be found in Price (1954), who argues that
doxastic oughts are made true by our ability to direct our attention and thereby cause ourselves to believe.
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Again, Rinard’s claim is that we cannot just live in the country, sit in the front row,
or spend time in Costa Rica as direct responses to reasons—in the way we can
perform basic actions as direct responses to reasons, or form beliefs as direct
responses to the evidence; nevertheless, the reasons for which we perform those
non-basic actions are reasons for those actions.
These complex actions are long-term activities which aim at bringing about or
keeping up a certain state of affairs—the states that you live in the country, sit in the
front row, or spend time in Costa Rica. Evidentialists can react to these cases in the
same way as they react to state-reasons: by arguing that reasons for long-term
activities are analyzable in terms of the reasons we have for performing basic
actions. Engaging in a long-term activity is not a motivationally immediate response
in the way performing basic actions are motivationally immediate responses to
practical reasons. Therefore, if there are reasons for belief in the same sense in
which there are reasons for long-term activities or non-basic actions, they won’t
pose a problem for evidentialism if they are in fact just fully analyzable in terms of
reasons for basic actions. This reductive analysis is especially plausible insofar as
basic actions are constitutive of non-basic actions, while basic actions are not
constitutive of the states that are caused by them.
There is another serious disadvantage for reading the argument from indirect
control as appealing to activities rather than to states. While beliefs are plausibly
conceived of as states, they are not so plausibly conceived of as activities—except if
we endorse a strong version of doxastic voluntarism. I do not deny that believing is
essentially accompanied by long-term activities, like by what Chrisman (2018) calls
‘maintaining a coherent system of beliefs’—an activity he takes to be crucial for
understanding epistemic normativity. However, the view that beliefs are themselves
long-term activities done for practical reasons seems to be confused. For one, we do
not perform long-term activities for practical reasons while asleep, but we do not
stop believing what we believe while asleep (cf. Boyle, 2011, 6). Furthermore, we
can partially explain why we perform long-term activities by reference to belief-
states: my aunt lives in the countryside because she believes that it is quiet there,
and because she appreciates a quiet life. In order for beliefs to serve such an
explanatory function, they cannot be long-term activities themselves, but must be
conceived of as stable dispositions (cf. Chrisman, 2018, 514). Finally, I take it that
discussions about reasons for belief and norms of epistemic rationality are supposed
to concern reasons and norms for states of belief. If we instead ask for the norms
that govern certain activities that we call ‘believing’, we just change the topic: we
talk about the normativity of a different kind of entity than the entity those debates
are concerned with. This new entity might be closely related to states of belief, but it
is not what most philosophers wish to talk about when discussing doxastic
normativity.28
28 Boyle (2011) and Hieronymi (2009; ms) conceive of beliefs as ‘active states’. Importantly, however,
both agree that this category of active states (which I term ‘intentional states’) is different from
intentional actions that we perform for practical reasons. Hieronymi explicitly distinguishes between
‘managerial control’ (the kind of control we exercise when we perform actions for practical reasons) and
‘evaluative control’ (the kind of control we exercise when we, e.g., believe for epistemic reasons). Boyle
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I will therefore not discuss further the option of whether practical reasons for
belief could be understood by modelling them on practical reasons for long-term
activities, or for other non-basic actions. It seems much more promising for the
pragmatist to explore the relationship between state-reasons and reasons for action
in order to develop a substantial notion of practical reasons for belief. For belief is
plausibly conceived of as a state, but not so plausibly as a non-basic action.
Furthermore, reasons for non-basic actions are more plausibly reducible to reasons
for basic actions than reasons for states insofar as basic actions are constitutive of
non-basic actions but not constitutive of states.
5 The pragmatist’s options: irreducible state-reasons or doxastic
voluntarism
Rinard (2015, 213) agrees that in the case of reasons for states (and long-term
activities), ‘the causal connection between the pragmatic consideration for u-ing,
and the agent’s actually u-ing, is complex and indirect’. This already highlights an
important distinction between being in a state for a reason by performing an action
for this reason, on the one hand, and performing a basic action directly for a reason
or believing directly on the basis of evidence, on the other. This distinction gives
rise to the two possible strategies (i) and (ii) which I mentioned in the introductory
section of this paper: Since any motivation of a response by a reason is either
indirect or direct (either there is a motivational mediator or there isn’t), pragmatists
must employ at least one of these strategies if they wish to argue that there are
practical reasons for belief that satisfy the motivational constraint. This section
elaborates on these two options in more detail.
Consider:
The new pragmatist’s strategy (corresponding to option (i)): Practical reasons
can motivate belief via motivationally intermediate actions that then result in
belief, so that the relation between the reason and the response to the reason is
indirect (as in the case of reasons for states, or reasons for long-term activities
and other non-basic actions).
The traditional pragmatist’s strategy (corresponding to option (ii)): Practical
reasons can motivate belief without motivationally intermediate actions, so
that the relation between reason and response is that of being directly based on
the reason (as in the case of performing basic actions for reasons, or in the case
of believing directly on the basis of evidence).
Consider first the new pragmatist’s strategy in light of my overall argument. This
strategy appears to put pragmatists on the safe side insofar as it is rather
uncontroversial that we can at least exercise indirect control over some of our
beliefs (cf. note 8 for examples). By contrast, it is much more controversial whether
Footnote 28 continued
and Hieronymi agree that belief is an activity, but one that importantly differs from intentional action—
this is precisely why they think that we need a separate account for this sui generis activity.
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we can control beliefs as directly as we can control basic actions. The new
pragmatist therefore rightly emphasizes that beliefs can be motivationally indirect
responses to practical reasons. Throughout the previous sections, I have contended
that their argument from indirect motivation is best understood as drawing an
analogy between reasons for belief and reasons for non-intentional states (wearing
wool socks, being a philosopher, being able to play the piano). The new pragmatists
therefore establish that there can be practical reasons for belief as there can be
practical reasons for non-intentional states.
However, maybe surprisingly, evidentialists can grant this conclusion. They can
agree that we sometimes say such things as ‘you ought to wear wool socks’, ‘you
ought to be a philosopher’, ‘you ought to be able to play the piano’, thereby making
not merely evaluative statements, but implying practical reasons for a person to be
in that state. Analogously, they can agree that ‘you ought to believe in human-
induced climate change’ or ‘you ought to have no racist beliefs’ sometimes imply
practical reasons for being in that doxastic state (cf. end of Sect. 3). However, the
evidentialist will then argue that by saying such things, we merely refer elliptically
to reasons for actions. In order to wear wool socks, you have to put them on; in order
to be a philosopher, you have to take steps to become one; and in order to be able to
play the piano, you have to practice. Analogously, in order to have no irresponsible
or disrespectful beliefs, you have to fulfill your duties of inquiry, monitor your
implicit biases, or ensure that your mind is sufficiently rational by, say, taking care
of yourself. That is, evidentialists will argue that there are practical state-reasons
only insofar as the actions that are likely to bring the state about are supported by
reasons. Evidentialists have no problem allowing for ‘practical reasons for belief’ in
this sense—at least as long as we grant that these are indeed reducible to reasons for
action (an issue I discuss in Sect. 6). This is why pragmatists who appeal to indirect
motivation have to argue that state-reasons are not just reducible to reasons to act—
which is dialectical option (i) for pragmatists (cf. Sect. 1).
Consider the next option (ii) for pragmatists—the traditional pragmatist’s
strategy. This strategy is to argue that practical reasons for belief meet the
motivational constraint because practical reasons can motivate belief not only
indirectly, but also directly. Traditional pragmatism holds that we can sometimes
believe directly for practical reasons in the way we can just perform basic actions
directly for practical reasons, or in the way we can believe directly on the basis of
evidence (cf. McCormick, 2015, 2020; Rinard, 2019a, 1944–1945, 2019b,
778–780). The main challenge for this view is to show that a belief that directly
results from considering a practical reason is not merely caused, but actually based
on the practical reason.29 Yet it is important to see that meeting this challenge does
not commit traditional pragmatists to a stronger claim: that we can sometimes
explicitly decide to believe for practical reasons (as defended by, e.g., Ginet, 2001).
29 Cf. Carter and Bondy (2020) on the recent debate on the epistemic basing-relation. As I noted in the
introductory section, all kinds of factors cause and influence our beliefs without being reasons for which
we believe. Traditional pragmatists must show that practical reasons sometimes do not merely cause our
beliefs directly but rather provide good direct bases for belief (which, of course, might just consist in
causing them in the right way). Cf. note 30 on believing at will as believing directly for practical reasons.
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Instead, it is open for them to argue that there are less explicit ways of believing
directly for practical reasons than deciding to believe. For instance, McCormick
(2015) has argued that the way we control beliefs is sometimes analogous to the way
we control many actions that are less than fully voluntary, intentional, or conscious.
One of her examples is taking each individual step for a reason while going for a
walk (ibid., 82). She supports this analogy between control over actions and control
over beliefs by arguing that we have guidance control over both—i.e., she argues
that beliefs are often responsive to practical reasons in the same way as actions are
often responsive to practical reasons.
Here I am not concerned with whether such strategies for defending the idea that
we can believe directly for practical reasons are successful. It is thus open for
traditional pragmatists to argue that ‘believing directly for practical reasons’ allows
for a reading that is not just restricted to explicit decisions to believe, and that this
more permissive reading is already sufficient for practical reasons for belief to pass
the motivational constraint.30
My main point in this paper is rather that the argument from indirect motivation
does not, by itself, establish pragmatism. All the argument from indirect motivation
shows is that we can ‘believe for practical reasons’ in the sense that we can
indirectly respond to state-reasons for belief. But this might well be compatible with
evidentialism. For state-reasons for belief could be reducible to reasons to act. By
reducing state-reasons for belief, the evidentialist can deny irreducible practical
reasons for belief, which are presupposed by the new pragmatist’s argument from
indirect motivation. Their argument therefore does not, by itself, establish that
evidentialism is false. The new pragmatists owe us an argument why state-reasons
are irreducible.
I will summarize the dialectical landscape sketched here in the concluding
section. First, however, I will present an argument that state-reasons are reducible. I
will argue that irreducible state-reasons are hard to square with the motivational
constraint on reasons. The new pragmatist’s strategy therefore does not amount to a
satisfying reply to the new evidentialists (cf. note 2).
6 The logic of state-reasons
The argument from indirect motivation establishes that there are practical state-
reasons for belief. I therefore agree with Rinard (2019b, 775) that it would be absurd
to ‘say that, in general, we do not have motivating reasons for anything we do
indirectly’. There is a sense in which we can have a motivating reason for being in a
30 There is no fixed use of ‘believing at will’ in ordinary language, and philosophers like Bennett (1990)
and Hieronymi (2008) define it as believing directly for practical reasons, and they contrast it with
(a) believing indirectly for practical reasons (causing belief) and (b) with a belief’s merely being caused
by practical considerations. In case (a), the belief would not be directly based on the reason; in case (b), it
would not be based on the reason at all. I argue in Schmidt (2016) that all purported cases of believing
directly for practical reasons fall either into (a) or (b), so that there are no cases in which we believe
directly on the basis of a practical reason.
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non-intentional state. Therefore, there can be practical reasons for being in states of
belief in precisely this same sense. However, as long as the pragmatist does not
present us with an argument why state-reasons aren’t just reducible to reasons to act,
they do not support the view that there are genuine practical reasons for belief.
Since the new pragmatists want to show that practical reasons can meet the
motivational constraint, this section will be concerned with the following question:
Are state-reasons irreducible if the motivational constraint is true?
In a first step, I will argue that the strictest version of the motivational constraint
implies that whenever you have a state-reason, you also have a reason to act (i.e., a
reason to bring the state about, or to maintain it) (Sect. 6.1). In a second step, I will
argue that even the weakest version of the motivational constraint still implies that
whenever you have a state-reason, you also have a reason to respond to this state-
reason (i.e., a reason to act, to try, to intend, or to desire) (Sect. 6.2). In a final step, I
argue that the new pragmatists therefore face the challenge of giving us an account
of the theoretical purpose for assuming irreducible state-reasons as normative
entities over and above the reasons for the responses that these state-reasons imply
(Sect. 6.3). Without such an account, we have no reason to assume that there are
irreducible state-reasons.
One last preliminary: my discussion will focus on reasons for non-intentional
states. My argument throughout Sects. 2–5 has revealed that they are central for
discussions about practical reasons for belief. However, just to be clear, I will
briefly summarize why reasons for non-intentional states are relevant. My main
point up to now was that the new pragmatist’s strategy relies on an analogy between
practical reasons to be in non-intentional states and practical reasons for being in
belief states. It establishes that there can be practical reasons for belief as there can
be practical reasons to be in non-intentional states. These are what I have dubbed
‘state-reasons’ for belief. The new pragmatist treats states of belief as if they were
non-intentional states one can be in (cf. esp. Rinard, 2017). This is why any
argument concerning reasons for non-intentional states will be applicable to state-
reasons for belief: state-reasons for belief just are the kinds of practical reasons for
belief that we get when we treat belief like just another non-intentional state.
6.1 State-reasons and reasons to act
Consider the strictest version of the motivational constraint:
Motivational Constraint (strict version) (MC). A consideration R is a reason
for you to u only if you can u for R.
If we apply MC to state-reasons, it says that R is a reason for you to be in a state s
only if you can be in s for R. But what does it mean to be in a state for a reason? It
means that you brought the state about for that reason, or that you are maintaining
the state for that reason. Therefore, MC implies:
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state-reasons imply reasons to act (SRRA). R is a reason for you to be in s
only if R is a reason for you to bring s about, or to maintain s.31
The only step that requires clarification is why ‘being in a state for a reason’ means
that you brought it about for that reason, or that you maintain it for that reason. To
see the plausibility of this step, we have to remember that we are concerned here
with non-intentional states. Consider, for instance, your reason to be at the top of a
mountain (say, you would be rewarded with an enjoyable view). There are of course
countless ways in which you might end up complying with that reason. You could
climb up to the top, for instance, or stay at the top if you are already there because
you want to enjoy the view a little longer. In these cases, you can be said to be at the
top for a reason: you climbed up for the enjoyable view, or you stayed there for the
enjoyable view. In other cases, you might comply with your reason to be at the top
because you are brought to the top by external forces: someone else might drag you
up against your will, or a strong gust of wind might carry you up. In these cases, you
still end up complying with your reason—after all, you end up being in the state that
your reason supports. However, you won’t be at the top of the mountain for a
(normative) reason. Rather, you merely comply. We can then merely explain why
you are up there by citing the causal factors that brought you there. But these factors
are not reasons for which you are at the top—i.e., they are not your motivating
reasons. Therefore, you can only be said to be at the top of the mountain for a reason
if you are, in a broad sense, exercising your own agency by climbing up for that
reason, or by staying there for that reason.
This seems to hold for all non-intentional states. Whenever you are brought into
or kept in a state without exercising your own agency, you are not in that state for a
reason. But the only ways of exercising your agency that would get you into a non-
intentional state are bringing yourself into the state for a reason and maintaining the
state for a reason.32 Therefore, whenever you are in a non-intentional state for a
reason—and thus whenever you are in a state of belief for a state-reason—you have
either brought yourself into that state for that reason or you maintained that state for
that reason. I conclude that MC implies SRRA.33
31 To be precise, MC and my analysis of ‘being in a state for a reason’ imply that R is a state-reason for
you to be in s only if you can bring about s for R or maintain s for R. But if you can u for a reason R, then
R is a reason for you to u. From this we can deduce SRRA. Thanks to Franziska Poprawe for urging me
to make this explicit.
32 Interestingly, this does not hold for intentional states. You can believe on the basis of evidence without
bringing the belief about for a reason or maintaining it for a reason. And if the traditional pragmatists
were right, you could believe directly for practical reasons without bringing the belief about for a reason
or maintaining it for a reason. Note, however, that this is so only if we read ‘bringing about’ and
‘maintaining’ as referring to actions—i.e., as something we can do directly for practical reasons. There is
another, passive, sense in which you will always ‘bring about’ a belief whenever you come to believe
something and ‘maintain’ a belief whenever it persists from one moment to the next. But these are not the
active senses of ‘bringing about’ and ‘maintaining’ that I am employing here.
33 While developing this argument, I noticed that there is another interesting way of defending SRRA
that does not rely on MC. Suppose you have a reason to be at the top of the mountain. In order to be at the
top, you will have to climb up or stay there. Thus, climbing up or staying there are (taken together) a
necessary means for being at the top for a reason. More generally, bringing a state about or maintaining a
state are (taken together) a necessary means for being in a state for a reason. Therefore, if we assume that
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Before proceeding to the final step of my argument—namely, to show that the
new pragmatists face a serious challenge if they accept SRRA but maintain that
state-reasons are irreducible—we need to consider whether weaker versions of the
motivational constraint than MC also imply SRRA. For the new pragmatists might
argue that MC is too strong, and instead accept a weaker version of the constraint in
order to avoid SRRA. I will argue that weaker versions of MC either do imply
SRRA or at least imply a claim similar to SRRA that will give rise to a challenge
very similar to the one to which SRRA gives rise.
6.2 State-reasons and reasons to respond
To see how MC might be too strong, consider first how it is incompatible with
Reisner’s (2009, 271) ‘argument from blocked ascent’. Suppose that you would get
a huge reward for being at the top of the mountain, but that you won’t get the reward
if you take any means to get up there (e.g., climbing). Suppose furthermore that you
are not already at the top of the mountain. Reisner thinks the reward still provides
you with a reason to be at the top even though you have no reason to bring yourself
to be at the top. This would be a counterexample to SRRA. However, MC rules out
that you have a reason for being in the state when ascent is blocked in this way:
since you cannot even comply with your state-reason in such cases by exercising
your own agency, you can also not be at the top of the mountain for this reason. If
we accept MC, all we can say is that it would be good for you to be at the top of the
mountain, but not that you have a genuine reason to be there. However, Reisner
could then just reply that MC is too strong and must be formulated less strictly.
Weaker versions of the motivational constraint might allow Reisner’s argument
to go through. SRRA would then turn out to be false if we assume such weaker
versions. What is the weakest version of the motivational constraint? One central
feature of the motivational constraint is, as we just saw, that it allows us to
distinguish the merely evaluative (what is merely good) from the normative (what is
good and provides us with a normative reason) in terms of an agent’s abilities. Since
making this distinction is one of the main motivations for endorsing a version of the
motivational constraint (cf. Way & Whiting, 2016, 215), I will assume that any
claim that could plausibly count as a version of the motivational constraint must
allow us to draw such a distinction between the evaluative and the normative. The
following claim fulfills this condition:
Motivational Constraint (weak version) (MCW). A consideration R is a reason
for you to u only if R can motivate at least one of your responses (i.e., you can
u for R, or try to u for R, or intend to u for R, or desire to u for R, etc.).
Footnote 33 continued
reasons for aims transmit to necessary means for that aim (as defended extensively by Kiesewetter,
2015, 2018), any state-reason will imply a reason to bring the state about, or to maintain it. Even though I
do not need to rely on a principle of necessary means transmission if I assume MC, this line of argument
still seems worth mentioning, for it provides a basis for defending SRRA without assuming MC.
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MCW implies that if there is a valuable state that cannot motivate any of your
responses, then this state does not provide you with a reason. Such states might
include states that you are unable to know about, or states you are psychologically
incapable of forming any attitude towards. This weak version therefore still captures
the spirit of the motivational constraint by drawing a line between the merely
evaluative and the normative. Furthermore, it is hard to see how we can formulate
an even weaker version of the motivational constraint that would still draw such a
line: if we allow for values that provide us with genuine reasons even though they
cannot motivate any of our responses, then we will blur the line between the
evaluative and the normative that the motivational constraint is meant to draw.
Therefore, MCW is the weakest version of the motivational constraint. Any claim
that could count as a version of the motivational constraint will at least imply that
your reasons are such that they can motivate one of your responses.34
Now return to Reisner’s cases of blocked ascent. If we reject MC and merely
accept the weak version MCW, then the reward that you get for being at the top of
the mountain might still provide you with a reason to be at the top, even if you have
no reason to climb up (remember that you won’t get the reward if you take any
means to get to the top). This is because the reward might still motivate one of your
responses: you could desire to be at the top of the mountain for the reason that you
would get a reward, or (in some possible worlds) hope that Scotty will beam you up.
For all that MCW says, this might be sufficient for the reward to provide you with a
genuine reason to be at the top—i.e., a genuine state-reason. Therefore, it seems that
state-reasons do not imply reasons to act if one endorses MCW rather than MC. It
seems that the weakest version of the motivational constraint does not imply SRRA.
In reply, I grant, for the sake of argument, that you might have a state-reason to
be at the top of the mountain even in cases of blocked ascent. However, even if one
can avoid SRRA in this way, state-reasons will still have the following implication
if we accept MCW:
State-reasons imply reasons to respond (SRRR). R is a state-reason for you to
be in s only if R is a reason for you [to bring yourself into s, or to maintain
yourself being in s, or to try to bring yourself into s, or to try to maintain
yourself being in s, or to intend to bring yourself into s, or to intend to
maintain yourself being in s, or to desire to be in s, or to hope to be in s, or
…].
While SRRR won’t allow us to say that state-reasons are reducible to reasons to act,
it still leaves open the possibility that state-reasons are reducible to reasons for the
34 One might wish to formulate an even weaker version by appealing to counterfactuals: one has a reason
R to u only if one can u (or try, or intend, or desire to u) for R in at least one close counterfactual
scenario. However, even if that was a plausible weakest version of the constraint, it won’t help the new
pragmatist. For in cases of blocked ascent, one will then have a reason to be at the top of the mountain
and a reason to climb up. After all, in at least one close counterfactual scenario, your ascent won’t be
blocked (you would get the reward even if you climb). Assuming such a version of the constraint would
thus not allow the construction of a counterexample to SRRA: both reasons to be in states as well as
reasons to bring states about (or maintain them) would be equally easy to come by. Thanks to Arturs
Logins for drawing my attention to this possible weaker formulation.
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various responses that a state-reason implies (reasons to act, try, intend, desire,
hope, etc.). SRRR will therefore still give rise to a very similar challenge for the
new pragmatists as SRRA does. I now turn to this challenge.35
6.3 The challenge for new pragmatism
I have argued that MC implies SRRA, and that any weaker version of the constraint
will at least imply SRRR. To see the challenge that SRRA/SRRR gives rise to for
the new pragmatists, we first have to remind ourselves that their strategy consists in
showing that practical reasons for belief—which they understand as state-reasons—
can meet MC. If they consequently accept SRRA/SRRR, they must argue that state-
reasons are still not just reducible to the reasons for the responses that are implied
by state-reasons. Rather, they would have to claim that state-reasons are normative
entities over and above the reasons for the responses that they imply.
However, this claim faces a serious challenge. As Derek Parfit (2011, 432)
pointed out, ‘I might truly claim, for example, that I have a reason to be in Paris next
April. But […] such reasons would have no importance. It would be enough to claim
that I have reasons to want to be in Paris next April, and to go there, if I can’. He
also states that ‘it is not worth claiming’ that one has a reason to be in a state (cf.
ibid., 51). The point is, I take it, that it is not obvious at all why we should say that
we have a state-reason additionally to the reasons for the responses this state-reason
implies. What is the theoretical purpose of assuming such normative entities over
and above the reasons for the implied responses? One such purpose is to defend new
pragmatism. Obviously, however, the new pragmatists have to find an independent
purpose for irreducible state-reasons.
To illustrate what I mean by such a ‘theoretical purpose’, consider the following
possible attempt by the new pragmatist to meet this challenge. They could appeal to
some explanatory relation between the state-reason and the reasons implied by it that
precludes that the state-reason is just analyzable in terms of the reasons it implies:
whenever a subject has a reason to bring a state about (or to maintain it, or to try to do
so, etc.), this is so because they have a reason to be in the state.36 However, the main
challenge for this view is to tell us why this amounts to anything more than to just
saying that whenever one has a reason to bring a state about (or to maintain it, etc.),
this is so because the state is valuable. It does not seem that the normative can explain
35 Berker (2018, 461–467) argues that in many cases reasons to desire (and reasons to try, and to intend)
admit of a combinatorial behavior that is different from genuine practical reasons. He concludes from this
that practical reasons for belief cannot be analyzed as reasons to desire (or as reasons to try, or to intend).
If Berker was right, then we could also conclude that a reason to desire to be in a state won’t imply that
you have a practical reason to be in a state. The new pragmatists would then owe us an additional
argument why we have a practical reason to be at the top of the mountain in cases of blocked ascent. The
mere fact that you have a reason to desire to be at the top would not establish that you have a genuine
practical reason to be there. Rather, it would seem again that you only have a practical reason to be at the
top if you also have a practical reason to bring yourself there, or to maintain your state. I sympathize with
Berker’s argument, but for the purposes of my discussion here I need not rely on it.
36 I owe the idea that state-reasons might be explanatorily prior to reasons for action to Franziska
Poprawe. Cf. also Reisner (2009, 269–270) for a very similar point.
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my reason to bring myself to be in the state (or to maintain it) better than the
evaluative. And remember that, as I have pointed out above, as long as one wishes to
retain some version of the motivational constraint, one commits to a distinction
between the normative and the evaluative: the new pragmatists cannot, while pursuing
their argument that state-reasons for belief satisfy the motivational constraint, just say
that every good state provides one with a state-reason to be in that state. For blurring
the distinction between the evaluative and the normative in this way would amount to
giving up on the motivational constraint even in its weakest form.
This is, of course, not the end of the matter. I hope that my discussion gives us an
idea of the kind of questions and arguments that are relevant for deciding whether
state-reasons are reducible to reasons to act—which is, as I have argued in the
previous sections, the central question for deciding the prospects of the new
pragmatist’s strategy. I have argued in this section that if pragmatists wish to
preserve a version of the motivational constraint on reasons (as our new pragmatists
do), they should accept either SRRA or at least SRRR. Furthermore, I have posed a
challenge for any pragmatist who accepts SRRA/SRRR and at the same time wants
to maintain the irreducibility of state-reasons: they have to give an account of the
theoretical purpose for assuming the existence of state-reasons over and above the
reasons for the responses that state-reasons imply. Finally, I have just objected to
one such intuitively plausible account.
7 Conclusion
The overall aim of this paper was to evaluate the argument from indirect motivation,
the conclusion of which is also presupposed by the argument frommere causation (cf.
Sect. 2), and to thereby reshape the dialectical options for pragmatists who accept the
motivational constraint. I have contended (cf. Sects. 3 and 4) that the argument from
indirect motivation only establishes that there are practical reasons for belief that meet
the motivational constraint if we assume that state-reasons are irreducible. That is, the
new pragmatist is committed to the view that state-reasons for belief are not just
reasons to bring the belief about, or to maintain it. However, we also saw (cf. Sect. 6)
that the irreducibility of state-reasons is hard to maintain if one accepts the
motivational constraint on reasons. The new pragmatist’s argument from indirect
motivation therefore seems to be incompatible with the very constraint it attempts to
meet. For on any plausible version of the motivational constraint, state-reasons imply
reasons to act (or to try, intend, desire). The new pragmatists owe us an explanation
why we should assume that there are irreducible normative entities over and above the
reasons for responses that state-reasons imply, given the motivational constraint.
The argument from mere causation (cf. Sect. 2) faces the same problem as the
argument from indirect motivation. Assume once more that there are cases in which
we brought about a belief for a reason and where our evidence merely caused our
belief, rather than providing us with a reason for this belief.We can now acknowledge
that in such cases, if these cases are indeed conceivable, there is a state-reason for
which we believe. We can thus avoid the problematic conclusion that we do not
believe for a reason in any sense in this case. However, as long as we have no
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argument why this state-reason is a normative entity over and above the reason for the
implied responses, we have no reason to assume that there are such entities.
As I pointed out in Sect. 5, new pragmatism is not the only way for pragmatists
to go. Instead of arguing for the irreducibility of state-reasons, they could instead
stick to traditional pragmatism and argue that we can believe directly for practical
reasons, i.e., at will (cf. note 30). That is, they could argue that practical reasons can
directly motivate belief in the way they can directly motivate action. In order to do
so, they must show that beliefs can be directly based on practical reasons without
motivationally mediating actions (i.e., without ‘bringing abouts’ or ‘maintainings’).
This would establish that practical reasons for belief are not just reasons analogous
to reasons for being in non-intentional states, but rather that they are reasons
analogous to reasons that directly motivate action. Whether beliefs can be direct
responses to practical reasons is controversial. But since the prospects for endorsing
the motivational constraint and at the same time maintaining the irreducibility of
state-reasons are dim, my overall argument suggests that defending traditional
pragmatism is a more promising route than new pragmatism.
My discussion provides us with an Überblick of how one can defend a pragmatist
account of reasons for belief. Rather than having scattered arguments for and
against pragmatism here and there, we can now see that each argument in favor of a
version of pragmatism that respects the motivational constraint needs to establish
either of two claims:
(i) State-reasons for belief are not reducible to reasons to act (or to try, intend,
desire, …).
(ii) We can sometimes believe directly for practical reasons.
These are the only options for such pragmatists because in order to meet the
motivational constraint, pragmatists have to appeal either to indirect motivation or to
direct motivation. As I have argued, appeals to indirect motivation presuppose (i).
Therefore, (i) and (ii) are the only options for defending a pragmatist account of
reasons for belief that respects the motivational constraint. Pragmatists who defend
only (ii) but not (i) can be called ‘traditional pragmatists’, while pragmatists who
defend (i) but not (ii) might be labelled ‘new pragmatists’. Of course, pragmatists
could defend both claims. Evidentialists have to deny both (i) and (ii). I have argued
against (i) by showing that it is hard to square with the motivational constraint on
reasons: if we accept the motivational constraint, then state-reasons imply reasons to
act (or to try, intend, desire); it is then hard to seewhy state-reasons should be anything
over and above the reasons for those actions (or tryings, intendings, desirings).
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